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I. INTRODUCTION
David was pulled over for driving with an expired registration tag.
After the officer asked for David’s license and registration, the officer
learned that David was also driving with a suspended license. The
officer asked David to step out of the car so that it could be impounded.
“Impounding a car,” the officer remarked, “ensures that drivers with sus-
pended licenses will not drive away once the officer leaves the scene.”
David reached into his pocket as he got out of the car. The officer,
nervous with the gesture, asked David not to reach into his pocket again.
David replied that he was simply checking for his cell phone.
Before leaving the scene, the officer took inventory of the items in
David’s car. The City requires taking such inventory as a precondition to
impounding, to eliminate its liability for any damage or missing parts.
Upon checking under the hood, the officer discovered two hidden guns.
David was placed under arrest and subsequently searched at the scene.
The officer, during the search, confiscated David’s cell phone and
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scrolled through his contact list and text messages. Believing that certain
contacts’ names indicated gang affiliation, the officer brought David and
his phone to the station. At the station, another officer looked through
the phone much more intently, focusing on David’s video and picture
folders. Eventually, the officer found a photograph linking David to a
shooting that took place nearly three weeks before his arrest. This photo-
graph became the principal piece of evidence leading to guilty verdicts
of attempted murder and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. David
was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.1
Before the Supreme Court decided Riley v. California,2 police
officers were, in most jurisdictions, free to rummage through arrestees’
cell phones without a warrant during a search incident to arrest. Now,
after a much-anticipated pronouncement by the Court, the intimate infor-
mation individuals store in modern-day cell phones is protected under
the Fourth Amendment.3 Police officers can no longer search a cell
phone incident to arrest, absent exigent circumstances.4
Before Riley was decided, only a small minority of jurisdictions
expressly forbade warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest: the
First Circuit5 (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island), Florida,6 and Ohio.7 All remaining states and federal cir-
cuits either found that the searches were constitutional or had not yet
addressed the issue.8 Consequently, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Riley resolved a distinct jurisdictional split in treatment of warrantless
cell phone searches incident to arrest.9
This note explores the progression of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that led to the Court’s pronouncement in Riley. It also examines
the different approaches jurisdictions took in tackling the constitutional-
ity of these searches before Riley was decided, applying the same semi-
1. The above scenario is based on the facts of People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL
475242, at *1–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014). The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of David Riley’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his cell phone. Id.
2. 134 S. Ct. 2473.
3. Id. at 2495.
4. Id. at 2493 (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune
from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a
cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”).
5. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
6. See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 740 (Fla. 2013).
7. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009).
8. Dana Liebelson, Supreme Court to Cops Who Want to Search Your Cellphone: Get a
Warrant, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 17, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/
09/police-cell-phone-search-warrant-supreme-court.
9. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.
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nal cases that drove the Riley Court to ultimately find that warrantless
searches incident to arrest are protected under the Fourth Amendment.
This note then argues that the Court could have found the same protec-
tions under a First Amendment methodology.
This note begins with a background discussion of the Supreme
Court’s search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, starting with the seminal case
of Chimel v. United States.10 Part II seeks to lay the foundation for anal-
ysis of earlier cases, where lower courts grappled with the constitution-
ality of warrantless cell phone searches. Part III explores the conflicting
approaches of various appellate courts that attempted to resolve the issue
pursuant to established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Parts IV and
V address the Fourth and First Amendments, their history, and what they
seek to protect. These parts seek to demonstrate that the Founding
Fathers would have authorized protection against warrantless cell phone
searches. Part VI explains how, under both the First and Fourth Amend-
ments, the Court could have found that warrantless cell phone searches
incident to arrest are unconstitutional. Finally, Part VII looks closely at
the Riley opinion and the Court’s analysis of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, which ultimately led to the Court’s holding that warrantless
cell phone searches incident to arrest are unconstitutional.
II. SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
“It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a tradi-
tional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”11 Searches of a cell phone, however, present a different slew of
issues not easily comparable to those decided by the Court under its
search-incident-to-arrest jurisprudence. The controversy surrounding
warrantless searches of cell phones first gained traction after the Fifth
Circuit decided United States v. Finley in 2007.12 There, the court analy-
zed numerous Supreme Court cases, beginning with United States v.
Robinson,13 to ultimately decide that a warrantless search of a cell phone
10. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
12. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). Because the Fifth Circuit was the
first circuit court of appeals to decide the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches
(where the issue regarded a search of text messages and call records), that court compared the
search of the cell phone to that of a pager, which had been at issue in a Seventh Circuit case that
held that “the information from the pager was properly seized incident to a valid arrest.” United
States v. Ortiz, 87 F.3d 977, 983 (7th Cir. 1996). This comparison is problematic. The private
information that a pager is capable of storing—phone numbers—is nominal compared to the
many forms of information—pictures, contacts, text messages, videos, location information,
etc.—stored in large quantities on cell phones.
13. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218.
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incident to arrest was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.14
Below is an overview of the seminal Supreme Court cases that lower
courts have used to, essentially, fit “a square peg in a round hole.”15
In Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court first declared that
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible
against a defendant.16 Just eleven years later, the Court held that
searches incident to arrest were constitutional when conducted in order
to “find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things
to effect an escape from custody . . . .”17 While this language seems like
a comprehensible framework for determining which searches incident to
arrest are proper, the Court has reevaluated the standard in more recent
years, namely in 1969, in Chimel v. California.
Chimel v. California involved police officers searching a defen-
dant’s entire home pursuant only to an arrest warrant.18 There, after the
defendant denied an officer’s request to “look around” the house, the
officer explained that “‘on the basis of a lawful arrest,’ the officers
would nonetheless conduct the search.”19 The officers searched rooms
beyond the room in which the defendant was located and, in doing so,
uncovered inculpatory evidence that led to the defendant’s conviction.20
The Court held that this type of search was unconstitutional when con-
ducted solely under an arrest warrant:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun
on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
14. Finley, 477 F.3d at 250.
15. J. Patrick Warfield, Note, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Search-Incident-to-
Arrest Exception and Cellular Phones, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 165, 183 (2010). Just as a square
peg will not fit into a round hole, Supreme Court reasoning for legalizing general searches
incident to arrest does not neatly fit with reasoning to legalize warrantless cell phone searches
incident to arrest. See generally id. “[T]he standards for a search of a cell phone need to be truly
demarcated. . . . In order to confront the increasing use of such devices, the law needs to be clear
on what the Fourth Amendment protects.” Id. at 192–93.
16. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
17. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
18. 395 U.S. 752, 754–55 (1969).
19. Id. at 753–54.
20. Id.
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dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate
control”—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.21
In reasoning that the purpose of a search incident to arrest is to
protect officer safety and prevent destruction of evidence,22 the Court
made clear that searches incident to arrest are permitted a much nar-
rower physical scope than search warrants.23 Because the search in
Chimel went beyond the arrestee’s “person and the area from within
which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could
have been used as evidence against him,” the search was “‘unreason-
able’ under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”24
In 1973, the Court faced a new question regarding the scope of a
search incident to arrest.25 In United States v. Robinson, the defendant
was arrested for “operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his
operator’s permit.”26 Upon initially “patting down” the defendant, the
officer felt an object in the breast pocket of the coat that the defendant
was wearing.27 The officer testified that “he ‘couldn’t tell what it was’
and also that he ‘couldn’t actually tell the size of it.’”28 Subsequently,
the officer “pulled out the object, which turned out to be a ‘crumpled up
cigarette package.’”29 In recognizing (by touch) that the package did not
contain cigarettes, the officer opened it to find multiple capsules of
heroin.30
The Court held that the heroin capsules were admissible and that
the officer was entitled to inspect them as “fruits, instrumentalities, or
contraband probative of criminal conduct.”31 Thus, under Robinson,
police need not demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, that there was a
fear of weapons or destructible evidence every time they performed a
21. Id. at 762–63.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 763 (explaining that “[t]here is ample justification . . . for a search of the arrestee’s
person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. There is no
comparable justification . . . for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest
occurs—or . . . for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself.”).
24. Id. at 768.
25. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
26. Id. at 220.
27. Id. at 222.
28. Id. at 223.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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custodial search.32 The Court reasoned that a full search of a person
incident to a lawful arrest “is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search
under that Amendment.”33
United States v. Chadwick34 demonstrated a conflicting rationale
from that used in Robinson for determining when searches incident to
arrest are constitutional.35 In Chadwick, a “[police] dog signaled the
presence of a controlled substance” in a locked footlocker that the
defendants were attempting to load into a vehicle.36 Upon arrest, the
police allegedly took the keys to the footlocker from one of the defen-
dants.37 From that moment on, the footlocker was under the “exclusive
control”38 of the officers at all times; an officer testified that “there was
no risk that whatever was contained in the footlocker trunk would be
removed by the defendants or their associates.”39 At the police station,
ninety minutes after the arrest, officers opened the footlocker and found
substantial amounts of marijuana inside.40
The Chadwick Court held that it was unreasonable for the officers
to search the footlocker without a warrant.41 The Court explained:
[T]he footlocker’s mobility [does not] justify dispensing with the
added protections of the Warrant Clause. Once the federal agents had
32. Id. at 235 (“The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while
based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in
fact be found . . . .”).
33. Id.
34. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Chadwick has been abrogated by California v. Acevedo with respect to
police authority to search containers in vehicles. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1982).
In Acevedo, the Court held that when police have probable cause to suspect that a container inside
of a vehicle has contraband, the officers may search the container without a warrant. Id. at 580.
This rationale cannot apply, however, to cell phone searches. Even if a cell phone is considered a
“container,” no police dog (or other mechanism for determining probable cause) could ever
predict what the inside of a phone will hold. Chadwick’s reasoning is still necessarily important to
this note’s analysis, and is good law, because it demonstrates that articles within police
possession—where no danger or exigency exists—should not be searched without a warrant. See
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 1.
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 15. The Court explains: “Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or
other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the
property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.” Id. Here, the Court is attempting to distinguish between “property not immediately
associated with the person” (like a piece of luggage) and property (like the cigarette package in
Robinson) that is under the immediate control of arrestees. Id.
39. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 11.
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seized [the footlocker] at the railroad station and had safely trans-
ferred it to the Boston Federal Building under their exclusive control,
there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be
obtained.42
Because the footlocker presented no danger to the officers, the Court
held that acquiring a search warrant was necessary in order to lawfully
search for evidence.43 Moreover, because the defendants locked the foot-
locker, they showed a clear intent to keep its contents private.44
Finally, Arizona v. Gant narrowed earlier case law45 and clarified
Chimel’s “immediate control” doctrine, under which a search incident to
arrest can only occur in places within the arrestee’s “immediate con-
trol.”46 Quoting Chimel, the Court explained that “immediate control” is
“the area within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence.”47 There, the Court held that because the
arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a police car, “both justifications
for the search-incident-to-arrest exception [were] absent,” and the ensu-
ing search of arrestee’s vehicle was unreasonable without a warrant.48
All of the evidence obtained from the arrestee’s car, therefore, was inad-
missible under the Fourth Amendment.49
The cases above played a central role in several appellate courts’
and the Supreme Court’s analyses of the constitutionality of cell phone
searches incident to arrest.
III. THE CONFLICT IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL
APPELLATE COURTS50
Although the Supreme Court has now resolved the prior conflict
42. Id. at 13.
43. Id. (“With the footlocker safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the
additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant.”).
44. Id. at 11 (“No less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one who
safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment
Warrant Clause; since there was no exigency calling for an immediate search, it was unreasonable
for the Government to conduct the search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provides.”).
45. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (narrowing the broad holding in New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)). In Belton, the Court found that police may search the inside of a
vehicle incident to arrest of a recent occupant, even if the inside of the car is physically outside of
the arrestee’s reach. Belton, 454 U.S. at 454. This principle from Belton is no longer good law.
Gant, 566 U.S. at 335 (“Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.”).
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id. at 339.
49. Id. at 350–51.
50. The nine cases described in this Part are outlined more compactly in the Riley v. State
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surrounding differing jurisdictional treatment of warrantless cell phone
searches, this Part analyzes the legal landscape before the Riley opinion
was published.51 These cases reveal a common theme: general difficulty
realized by appellate courts attempting to extend Supreme Court prece-
dent on searches incident to arrest—which do not address searches of
advanced technology—to searches of cell phones incident to arrest (for
instance, whether to analogize a cell phone to a “container”).52
Nine separate appellate courts, both state and federal, addressed the
issue of warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, which ultimately ruled in favor of
protecting individuals from these searches under the Fourth Amend-
ment. The nine cases that shaped the environment for the Court’s deci-
sion are detailed below.
A. Courts That Upheld the Constitutionality of Warrantless Cell
Phone Searches Incident to Arrest
Three high-density jurisdictions—California, the Fourth Circuit,
and the Fifth Circuit—flatly found that a warrantless search of an
arrestee’s cell phone was constitutional.53 First, in People v. Diaz, the
California Supreme Court held that a warrantless cell phone search was
constitutional where the arrestee’s phone was seized at the police station
and searched nearly ninety minutes after the initial arrest.54 There, the
court explained that “unlike the footlocker in Chadwick, . . . the phone
was ‘personal property . . . immediately associated with [his] person’
like the cigarette package in Robinson.”55 The California Supreme Court
reasoned that a cell phone is more like clothing56 or cigarettes and not
like a footlocker because “the footlocker . . . was separate from the
petition for writ of certiorari. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–14, Riley v. State, 82
U.S.L.W. 3082 (2014) (No. 13-132), 2013 WL 3934033.
51. As explained infra Part III.B, some courts have attempted to stand on middle ground.
These courts have not gone so far as to allow police officers full disclosure to look through an
arrestee’s phone, but have nonetheless allowed the search in question.
52. See Warfield, supra note 15, at 183. R
53. The relevant cases in these three jurisdictions are the following: People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d
501 (Cal. 2011); United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009); and United States v.
Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
54. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505. Relying on the Supreme Court of California’s decision in Diaz, the
California Court of Appeal in People v. Riley held that a warrantless cell phone search incident to
arrest was constitutional. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1–4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
55. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)).
56. The case of United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), reasoned that no warrant was
needed when the defendant’s clothing, stained with evidence that placed him at the crime scene,
was taken from him roughly ten hours after his arrest. The Diaz court interpreted Edwards by
explaining that because the clothing was “immediately associated” with the arrestee’s person, no
warrant was required. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506.
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defendants’ persons and was merely within the ‘area’ of their ‘immedi-
ate control.’”57
The defendant argued that unlike clothing or crushed cigarettes,
however, a cell phone has the capacity to hold an exorbitant amount of
personal information that could never be found in other non-technologi-
cal items in an arrestee’s “immediate control.”58 In answering this argu-
ment, the court reasoned that small containers can carry private
information as well, such as “photographs, letters, or diaries.”59 While
true, the “sheer quantity”60 of personal information on a modern cell
phone cannot compare to even the bulkiest container. Nonetheless, the
court explained:
[E]ven were it true that the amount of personal information some cell
phones can store dwarfs that which can be carried on the person in a
spatial container—and, again, the record contains no evidence on this
question—defendant and the dissent fail to explain why this circum-
stance would justify exempting all cell phones, including those with
limited storage capacity, from the rule of Robinson, Edwards, and
Chadwick. A warrantless search, incident to a lawful arrest, of a cell
phone with limited storage capacity does not become constitutionally
unreasonable simply because other cell phones may have a signifi-
cantly greater storage capacity.61
The court concluded by stating that it based its holding on binding
Supreme Court precedent and that if, “in light of modern technology,”
the cases on which it relied must be reevaluated, it would be the
Supreme Court’s responsibility to do so.62
Next, the Fourth Circuit63 held that a warrantless cell phone search
was constitutional because the phone was on the defendant’s person at
the time of arrest, and that there was a need to preserve call records and
text messages stored on the phone.64 Continuing the analysis of the stor-
age capacity issue that the California Supreme Court addressed in Diaz,
the Fourth Circuit also dismissed the notion that a cell phone’s capacity
to hold information could be so large that it “would implicate a height-
ened expectation of privacy.”65 The court explained that because the
57. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506 (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 508.
60. Id. at 507.
61. Id. at 508 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. at 511.
63. The Fourth Circuit hears appeals from federal district courts in Maryland, Virginia, West
Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. About the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/about-the-court (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
64. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–13 (4th Cir. 2009).
65. Id. at 411.
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defendant made no distinction between “large” and “small” storage
capacities, there was no evidence presented to demonstrate that the
defendant’s phone had a large storage capacity, and no evidence could
ever demonstrate that information stored on a phone with a “large stor-
age capacity would be any less volatile than the information stored on a
cell phone with a small storage capacity.”66 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
found that the mere ability of a cell phone to hold massive amounts of
information is not enough to afford it extra privacy protections.67
Because “it is very likely that in the time it takes for officers to ascertain
a cell phone’s particular storage capacity, the information stored therein
could be permanently lost,” the officers needed no apparent justification
to conduct a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest.68
Finally, in the oft-cited Fifth Circuit69 decision of United States v.
Finley, the court held that text messages viewed pursuant to a warrant-
less cell phone search were admissible under the Fourth Amendment.70
There, the defendant relied on Supreme Court precedent to argue that the
phone is “analogous to a closed container” and could not be searched
without a warrant.71 In response, the Fifth Circuit explained that con-
trary to the defendant’s argument, no warrant was required for the search
of the phone and that, therefore, “[t]he district court correctly denied
[the defendant’s] motion to suppress the call records and text messages
retrieved from his cell phone.”72 Moreover, the court held that because
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. The court also explained that forcing police to learn the storage capacity of cell phones
before searching them would be unworkable. Id.
68. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, did not explain why or how the knowledge of a phone’s
capacity would somehow result in the “permanent loss” of all information on the phone. The court
further explained: “It is unlikely that police officers would have any way of knowing whether the
text messages and other information stored on a cell phone will be preserved or be automatically
deleted simply by looking at the cell phone.” Id. (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit seemed
worried about information on a phone magically disappearing. Why, specifically, is the
information on a cell phone so time-sensitive that it cannot be searched after a warrant was
procured? The court does not answer this question.
69. The Fifth Circuit hears appeals from federal district courts in Texas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. Court Locator, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator (last visited Feb.
3, 2015).
70. 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007).
71. Id. at 260. The defendant cited to Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), for this
theory. In Walter, a mistaken delivery of obscene film led to a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) investigation and warrantless search. Walter, 447 U.S. at 651–52. The Walter Court held
that although the materials were lawfully in the hands of police, the police had no authority to
search the contents without a warrant. Id. at 653–54. The Court additionally voiced First
Amendment concerns, noting that “[w]hen the contents of the package are books or other
materials arguably protected by the First Amendment, and when the basis for the seizure is
disapproval of the message contained therein, it is especially important that this [warrant]
requirement be scrupulously observed.” Id. at 655.
72. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260. Only four months after Finley was decided, the Northern District
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officers can retrieve “evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in
order to preserve it for use at trial,” the search of the defendant’s cell
phone incident to his arrest was constitutionally permitted.73
The California Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, and Fifth Circuit did
not restrict warrantless searches of cell phones. Thus, the precedent
established in these jurisdictions was simply that the search of a cell
phone incident to arrest was constitutionally permitted. Some courts, as
described below, allowed warrantless searches of cell phones that are
limited in scope.
B. Courts That Restricted the Scope of the Search in Relation to the
Alleged Crime
In United States v. Flores-Lopez, the Seventh Circuit74 held that the
search of a phone for the sole purpose of finding a phone number was
appropriate under the Fourth Amendment.75 The court, however, recog-
nized that “a modern cell phone is a computer”76 and considerations for
a more extensive search are “for another day.”77 Further, the court took
notice of the complications that accompany analogizing a cell phone to a
container.78 The court explained:
Even the dumbest of modern cell phones gives the user access to
large stores of information. For example, the “TracFone Prepaid Cell
Phone,” sold by Walgreens for $14.99, includes a camera, MMS
(multimedia messaging service) picture messaging for sending and
receiving photos, video, etc., mobile web access, text messaging,
voicemail, call waiting, a voice recorder, and a phonebook that can
of California took a contrary position on the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches.
See United States v. Park, No. 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). In
Park, the court explained that because “the line between cell phones and personal computers has
grown increasingly blurry,” cell phones should be afforded stronger privacy protections than
pagers or address books. Id. Because a warrantless cell phone search does not further the interests
of police safety or preservation of evidence, the court found that a warrant must be procured for
the fruits of the search to be admissible as evidence. Id. at *9–10.
73. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260. The court cited to its own precedent, United States v. Johnson, to
elucidate this point. See id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988)).
The court also relied on Belton’s holding that “police may search containers, whether open or
closed, located within arrestee’s reach.” Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (citing New York v. Belton, 452
U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981)). This case, however, was decided before the Court narrowed Belton’s
reach in Arizona v. Gant. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009) (holding that a
warrantless search is not permissible where the defendant is physically unable to destroy evidence
or obtain a weapon, i.e., when he is locked in the back of a police vehicle).
74. The Seventh Circuit hears federal appeals in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Court
Locator, supra note 69.
75. 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012).
76. Id. at 804.
77. Id. at 810.
78. Id. at 805–06.
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hold 1000 entries.79
The Seventh Circuit further discussed possible exigency issues
stemming from searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.80 “[R]emote
wiping,” as the court explained, is the ability of third parties, from a
remote location, to wipe away all information stored on a cell phone.81
The court, however, conceded that the likelihood of such a “remote
wipe” is conceivable, but improbable.82 To be sure, there are mecha-
nisms police can institute to assure that seized phones are not wiped
clean.83 Nonetheless, the court held that “[l]ooking in a cell phone for
just the cell phone’s phone number does not exceed what decisions like
Robinson . . . allow.”84
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also held that a lim-
ited search of a defendant’s recent call list was constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.85 In Commonwealth v. Phifer, the court explained
that because neither it nor the Supreme Court had addressed issues of
warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest, it “decline[d] the invi-
tation to venture very far into this thicket” of whether the contents of
cellular telephones may be searched in whole or in part incident to a
lawful arrest because doing so was unnecessary to decide the case.86 The
court agreed with the “cell phones are computers” notion from United
States v. Flores-Lopez:
[Cell phones] present novel and important questions about the rela-
tionship between the modern doctrine of search incident to arrest and
individual privacy rights. Although an individual’s reasonable expec-
tation of privacy is diminished concerning his or her physical person
when subject to a lawful arrest and taken into custody, the same may
not necessarily be true with respect to the privacy of the myriad types
of information stored in a cellular telephone that he or she is carrying
at the time of arrest.87
79. Id. at 806 (discussing TracFone Prepaid Cell Phone, WALGREENS, http://
www.walgreens.com/store/c/tracfone-prepaid-cell-phone/ID=prod6162901-product (last visited
Feb. 6, 2015)).
80. Id. at 808. Such issues include the delay involved with attempting to recover wiped data
in a laboratory. Id.
81. Id. The court further noted that “remote-wiping capability is available on all major cell-
phone platforms; if the phone’s manufacturer doesn’t offer it, it can be bought from a mobile-
security company.” Id.
82. Id. (“‘Conceivably’ is not ‘probably.’”).
83. Id. at 809 (discussing the option to turn the phone off or place the phone in a “Faraday
bag” or “Faraday cage” to isolate the phone from wireless networks, thereby preventing a wipe).
84. Id. (reasoning that a warrantless search of a cell phone solely to find its phone number is
not more invasive than the search of the cigarette pack in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973)).
85. Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Mass. 2012).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 216.
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The court limited its holding to the facts of the case, however, reasoning
that because “the officers . . . had probable cause to believe the tele-
phone’s recent call list would contain evidence relating to the crime for
which [the defendant] was arrested,” the search was constitutional.88 The
probable cause stemmed from an officer’s observation of the defendant
using the phone immediately before the drug transaction.89
Finally, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that warrantless
searches of cell phones are constitutional so long as they are appropriate
in scope and “reasonably practicable by the object of the search.”90
There, an undercover police officer posed as an individual attempting to
purchase drugs from the defendant.91 At the scene where the defendant
and the officer arranged to meet, the officer witnessed the defendant
entering information into her cell phone.92 Almost simultaneously, the
officer received a text from the defendant, stating that she was at the
scene.93 The officer promptly arrested the defendant, seized her phone,
and searched her text messages for a record of communications between
himself and the defendant.94
In holding that the search of the defendant’s cell phone was consti-
tutional, the court indicated that a limitless search of the phone would
not have produced the same result: “[W]hen the object of the search is to
discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for the
officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet browsing history
data stored in the phone.”95 Thus, like the Seventh Circuit96 and the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,97 the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches largely
depends on a “fact-specific inquiry.”98
The three cases above illustrate a distinct line of reasoning that
courts have followed in determining the constitutionality of warrantless
cell phone searches. These jurisdictions, contrary to those discussed
above,99 did not authorize a limitless search of all information stored on
arrestee’s cell phones. To the contrary, these courts held that the search
must relate to the crime for which the defendant was arrested.
88. Id. at 215.
89. Id. at 215–16.
90. Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012) (internal citations omitted).




95. Id. at 926 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).
97. See Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210 (Mass. 2012).
98. Hawkins, 723 S.E.2d at 926.
99. See supra Part III.A.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA305.txt unknown Seq: 14 27-AUG-15 11:35
912 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:899
C. Courts That Prohibit Any Search of a Cell Phone
Without a Warrant
Finally, only three jurisdictions held that a warrantless cell phone
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. United States
v. Wurie, which was consolidated with People v. Riley by the Supreme
Court,100 flatly rejected the notion that any cell phone search—limited or
limitless—may be procured without a warrant.101 The First Circuit102
developed a cogent exposition of Fourth Amendment search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine regarding warrantless cell phone searches when it con-
cluded that these searches are “inherently unreasonable because they are
never justified by one of the Chimel rationales: protecting arresting
officers or preserving destructible evidence.”103 The First Circuit
explained that expectations of privacy in cell phones warrant far differ-
ent considerations than other items frequently searched without a
warrant:
We suspect that the eighty-five percent of Americans who own cell
phones and use the devices to do much more than make phone calls
. . . would have some difficulty with the government’s view that
Wurie’s cell phone was indistinguishable from other kinds of per-
sonal possessions, like a cigarette package, wallet, pager, or address
book, that fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. In reality, a modern cell
phone is a computer, and a computer . . . is not just another purse or
address book. The storage capacity of today’s cell phones is
immense.104
Thus, the court reasoned that because phones contain substantially large
quantities of private information, and because no safety concerns or fear
of destroyed evidence arises in conjunction with waiting for a warrant, it
is proper for police officers to wait to search a phone until a neutral
magistrate issues a warrant.105
Accordingly, the First Circuit concluded by explaining that even
though the search in Wurie concerned only the defendant’s call log, all
100. The Court consolidated United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
82 U.S.L.W. 3104 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13-212), with People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013
WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), where the California Court of Appeal allowed a picture
from the defendant’s phone into evidence even though the crime that the picture depicted was
separate from that for which the defendant was arrested.
101. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 14.
102. The First Circuit hears federal appeals from federal district courts in Maine, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Puerto Rico. Court Locator, supra note 69. R
103. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 7.
104. Id. at 8 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. at 10–11.
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warrantless cell phone searches must be “governed by the same rule.”106
The First Circuit reached its conclusion by reasoning that a rule prem-
ised on specifics in individual cases “would prove impotent” if police
had “unlimited potential” to search in some instances and no ability to
search in others.107 Thus, the First Circuit denied police the ability to
conduct warrantless cell phone searches absent exigent circumstances.108
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida found that warrantless
searches of cell phones were unconstitutional.109 In Smallwood, the
Supreme Court of Florida distinguished Robinson by explaining that
Robinson plainly did not contemplate electronic devices with immense
storage capabilities when holding that the search of a cigarette package
was permissible without a warrant.110 The court took issue with the seri-
ous privacy concerns prevalent when police can methodically search a
cell phone incident to arrest.111 The court explained:
[I]n recent years, the capabilities of these small electronic devices
have expanded to the extent that most types are now interactive, com-
puter-like devices. Vast amounts of private, personal information can
be stored and accessed in or through these small electronic devices,
including not just phone numbers and call history, but also photos,
videos, bank records, medical information, daily planners, and even
correspondence between individuals through applications such as
Facebook and Twitter. The most private and secret personal informa-
tion and data is contained in or accessed through small portable elec-
tronic devices and, indeed, many people now store documents on
their equipment that also operates as a phone that, twenty years ago,
were stored and located only in home offices, in safes, or on home
computers.112
Further, the court analogized warrantless cell phone searches to “provid-
ing law enforcement with a key to access the home of the arrestee,”
enabling officers to search through all of the arrestee’s records, docu-
ments, and other personal information previously obtainable only by
“[p]hysically entering the arrestee’s home office.”113 Both the search of
the phone and the search of the home, according to the Supreme Court
of Florida, are “essentially the same for many people in today’s techno-
106. Id. at 13.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 740 (Fla. 2013).
110. Id. at 732.
111. Id. at 731–32.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 738 (“Physically entering the arrestee’s home office without a search warrant to
look in his file cabinets or desk, or remotely accessing his bank accounts and medical records
without a search warrant through an electronic cell phone, is essentially the same for many people
in today’s technologically advanced society.”).
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logically advanced society.”114
Like the First Circuit and the Supreme Court of Florida, the Ohio
Supreme Court also held that warrantless cell phone searches were
unconstitutional.115 The court declined to apply the Fifth Circuit’s rea-
soning in United States v. Finley116 and held that a warrantless cell
phone search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.117 In
State v. Smith, the defendant was arrested at home for allegedly dealing
drugs.118 During the course of a search incident to the defendant’s arrest,
the officer located the defendant’s cell phone and subsequently placed
the phone in his pocket, put the defendant in the patrol car, and contin-
ued to search for evidence.119 Without a warrant and without the defen-
dant’s consent, officers searched the phone, and “[t]here was testimony
that at least a portion of the search took place when officers returned to
the police station and were booking into evidence the items seized from
the crime scene.”120 Call records and phone numbers found within the
defendant’s cell phone during the search led to the defendant’s
conviction.121
The court reversed the trial court’s determination and, for numerous
reasons, expressly denied the state’s contention that a cell phone was
analogous to a closed container.122 First, New York v. Belton defined a
“container” as “any object capable of holding another object.”123 There-
fore, the court concluded that because a cell phone physically cannot
have another object inside of it, a cell phone is not a container.124 Next,
because “modern cell phones are capable of storing a wealth of digitized
information wholly unlike any physical object found within a closed
container,” the court held that a cell phone is not a closed container for
Fourth Amendment purposes.125 Furthermore, the court explained that
the “intricate” nature of cell phones necessitates a higher expectation of
114. Id.
115. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009).
116. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to apply the holding from United States v. Finley, the
most relevant authority regarding warrantless cell phone searches at the time Smith was decided,
because the defendant in Smith did not concede that a closed container and a cell phone are
comparable. See Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 953–54 (discussing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250
(5th Cir. 2007)).
117. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 956. The court was careful to note that Fourth Amendment doctrine
is particular to the facts of each case. In this situation, extracting the text messaging record and
phone numbers from defendant’s phone was unconstitutional. Id.
118. Id. at 950.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 951.
122. Id. at 953–54.
123. Id. at 954 (citing New York v. Belton, 452 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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privacy.126 Because a warrantless cell phone search does not ensure
officer safety or protect against “imminent destruction” of the phone’s
call records and phone numbers, and because an “individual has a pri-
vacy interest in the contents of a cell phone that goes beyond the privacy
interest in an address book or pager,”127 the Ohio Supreme Court found
that a warrant is required for a lawful cell phone search.128
Accordingly, nine different courts weighed in on this remarkable
constitutional conflict.129 Three courts were steadfast that cell phone
searches incident to arrest were constitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment.130 Another three courts required fact-specific analyses to deter-
mine whether such searches were constitutional, but nonetheless found
that searches may be constitutional so long as they were related to the
alleged crime.131 Finally, three additional courts held that the Fourth
Amendment affords individuals a high expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of their cell phones; warrantless cell phone searches do not impli-
cate concerns of officer safety or preservation of evidence, and thus the
searches fall beyond the scope of permitted searches incident to
arrest.132
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT133 AND THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
There now exists Supreme Court precedent examining the constitu-
tionality of warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest within the
context of the Fourth Amendment.134 The history of the Fourth Amend-
ment reveals that the Founding Fathers envisioned a country with legiti-
mate expectations of privacy for “papers” and “effects” to “circumscribe
government discretion.”135 Of course, cell phones did not exist in the
late 1700s. A material and modern interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
126. Id. at 955.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50. R
130. See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011); United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d
405, 411–13 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007).
131. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012); Hawkins v. State,
723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Mass. 2012).
132. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 740 (Fla. 2013); Smith,
920 N.E.2d at 956.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
134. See supra Part III.
135. See M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that
Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 906 (2010) (discussing the need to adapt the Framers’
intent behind Fourth Amendment protections to modern technology).
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ment, however, mandates that it protect the equivalent of “papers” and
“effects”—in the modern sense, technology—that also carries intimate,
private information.136
A. Historical Overview of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was born out of American colonialists’
seething opposition to the British practice of unlimited searches and
seizures.137 Under English law, the 1662 Act of Frauds gave rise to
court-issued writs of assistance, which “though not technically a warrant
. . . empowered a customs officer to search any place on nothing more
than his own (subjective) suspicion.”138 The 1696 Act of Frauds
“extended the broad enforcement powers in the 1662 Act to customs
officers in the colonies, authorizing the officers to conduct warrantless
searches at their discretion.”139 These warrants expired only upon the
death of the King or Queen; each search did not mandate the issuance of
a new writ of assistance.140 In 1761, James Otis, an esteemed lawyer in
Massachusetts, challenged the use of writs in Boston, where the econ-
omy largely “depended on trade in smuggled goods.”141 Otis contended
“that the writ of assistance was illegal, calling it an ‘instrument[ ] of
slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other.’”142 While Otis did
not prevail on this argument to the Massachusetts Superior Court, he
“galvanized support for what [would become] the Fourth
Amendment.”143
The use of general warrants provoked harsher aversion to
England’s search and seizure practices and “[f]urther inspiration for the
Fourth Amendment”:144
The general warrant . . . authorized an officer to search unspecified
places or to seize unspecified persons . . . , but in England the Crown
turned to the use of general warrants as a means of silencing its crit-
ics. Specifically, general warrants were used to gather evidence for
seditious libel prosecutions against the King’s detractors.145
Use of the general warrants evoked momentous action in court cases
136. Id. at 925 (“[T]oday’s emails and electronic documents are no less dear because they are
stored on electronic servers rather than in the secret cabinets and bureaus they have replaced.”).
137. Id. at 907.
138. Id. at 907–08.
139. Id. at 907.
140. Id. at 908.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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against the Crown.146 Although some cases proved victorious for those
challenging the Crown, the British officers in both England and the
American colonies did not stop using the general warrants and writs of
assistance.147 This practice left “citizens of the new American states
with a deep-dyed fear of discretionary searches permitted by general
warrants and writs of assistance.”148
Before the passage of the Bill of Rights, seven of the thirteen states
had developed their own versions of laws aimed at search and seizure
protection.149 “Thus, the principles that Otis expounded—the fundamen-
tal ‘Privilege of House’ and private papers, and the right to be free from
discretionary search at ‘the hands of every petty officer’—profoundly
influenced how the Fourth Amendment was understood at the time of its
adoption.”150
B. The Warrant Requirement and Expectations of Privacy
For a principle of the Constitution “to be vital[, it] must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”151 Thus, a
widely applicable rule is necessary for determining the types of searches
that enjoy Fourth Amendment protections. In Katz v. United States, Jus-
tice Harlan created a widely applicable two-part rule that has been
adopted by the Court for determining the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections.152 First, the defendant must have a subjective expectation of
privacy to that being searched.153 Next, society must, objectively, recog-
nize that expectation as reasonable.154
“[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness,’”155 there are certain situations where a warrant is not
required. For instance, no warrant is necessary for a government agent to
search information voluntarily conveyed to a third party.156 Further,
146. See id. at 909–11.
147. Id. at 911 n.44 (citing the passage of the Townshend Act of 1767 that “reauthorized writs
of assistance for customs searches in colonies”).
148. Id. at 911–12.
149. Id. at 912.
150. Id.
151. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Consequently, Judge Michael’s article is named after this quotation. See Michael, supra note 135, R
at 905.
152. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority in
Smith v. Maryland adopted Justice Harlan’s two-part test from Katz to hold that a warrantless
search of records given to a bank is neither private nor protected by the Fourth Amendment. Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
153. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
154. Id.
155. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
156. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
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where destruction of evidence is imminent or a person is in danger, exi-
gent circumstances dispose of the warrant requirement.157 Nonetheless,
“[s]earches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful not-
withstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause, for the Con-
stitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
officer be interposed between the citizen and the police.”158 Accord-
ingly, unless there is an abundantly clear reason to conduct a search
without a warrant, government agents must procure a warrant before
they can conduct a search.
In the context of warrantless searches of cell phones, as discussed
infra,159 the United States Supreme Court has finally answered “whether
the potentially vast amounts of data held on smartphones warrant a dif-
ferent approach under the Fourth Amendment, which bars unreasonable
searches.”160 In determining that warrantless cell phone searches are
unconstitutional, however, the Court could have gone beyond Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The First Amendment, additionally, provides pro-
tections that can be asserted against warrantless cell phone searches.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT161
As is evidenced above, courts struggled to discern whether vast
quantities of personal information stored on cell phones should be pro-
tected under the Fourth Amendment from warrantless searches incident
to arrest.162 Cell phones contain more than just phone numbers—they
are the modern-day repository for personal thoughts, religion, business
plans, and private dealings.163 Thus, the history and purpose of the First
Amendment is of consequence because the First Amendment, together
with the Fourth Amendment, show that the Founding Fathers undoubt-
edly intended to protect intimate information, like that in cell phones.
A. Background
“Persons attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be prose-
157. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 399.
158. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
159. See infra Part VI.
160. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Consider Whether Police Need Warrants to Search
Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/supreme-court-
to-consider-limits-of-cellphone-searches.html.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
162. See supra Parts II–III.
163. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (“Cell phones, however, place vast
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals.”).
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cuted; persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; persons
attempting to find a plot in it will be shot.”164
Mark Twain began one of the most acclaimed novels in American
history with this notice to his readers.165 What most readers do not
know, however, is that Mark Twain was not the actual name of the
author of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn—Samuel Clemens
was.166 Throughout history, Americans commonly used pseudonyms to
publish powerful, influential literary works.167
The importance of anonymity has strong, patriotic roots.168 “Our
history as a republic was shaped by essays written by anonymous
authors.”169 Notably, The Federalist Papers were circulated under the
fictitious name “Publius,” to promote the ratification of the Constitu-
tion.170 Prior to and during the American Revolutionary War, anonymity
was critical in concealing a writer’s name so that he could escape
punishment.171
The new American settlers brought with them a desire for democracy
and openness. They left behind a history of tyranny and official con-
trol of information. Using this experience as their guide, the constitu-
tional fathers wrote into their new Constitution a Bill of Rights,
which contained the First Amendment.172
The First Amendment’s protections, therefore, are an explicit reaction
by the Founding Fathers to break away from oppressive government.173
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble . . . . ”174 History demonstrates that,
164. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1917).
165. Id.
166. Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity,
2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 57 (2002) (discussing that, like Mark Twain, several American




169. Id. at 59 (explaining that “the use of anonymity was firmly ingrained in American society
and, as noted by the Supreme Court, . . . ‘an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.’”)
(quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 58 (“Obviously, before and during the war, anonymity was used to disguise the
identity of a writer who might be subject to British punishment.”).
172. The History of the First Amendment, ILL. PRESS ASS’N, http://www.illinoispress.org/
Foundation/1stAmendmentCenter/Research/TheFirstAmendment/InHistory.aspx (last visited Mar.
12, 2015).
173. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2009) (explaining that in the context of
declaring a statute regarding depictions of animal cruelty facially invalid, “the First Amendment
protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige”).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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unequivocally, the First Amendment is grounded on principles respect-
ing the individual right to express oneself without fear of punishment.175
B. The First Amendment’s Protection of Thought and Speech
The Supreme Court has held that the “right to receive information
and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free
society.”176 In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court declared that a Georgia law
banning private possession of obscene materials was unconstitutional.177
The Court found that the First Amendment guarantees a person freedom
from “invasion of personal liberties” and “the right to read or observe
what [an individual] pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.”178 Moreover, even
though the states retained the power to maintain obscenity laws, the
Court found that an individual’s possession of obscene material in his
home is an undeniable right secured by the First Amendment.179
Thus, over time, the Court has modernized and expanded the First
Amendment’s protections beyond the intentions of the Founding Fathers
to guarantee a broader freedom of expression.180 Renowned First
Amendment scholar and Yale professor Thomas Emerson has remarked,
“As the guarantee of freedom of conscience, also incorporated in the
[F]irst [A]mendment, reveals, the scope of the constitutional protection
was intended to extend to religion, art, science, and all areas of human
learning and knowledge.”181 The First Amendment’s freedoms, as a
result, comprise a fundamental constitutional right against government
intrusion.182
175. See Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First
Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 737 (1977) (“The First Amendment was clearly intended . . .
as a prohibition of any system of control over the process of printing, any advance censorship of
publication, and the like.”).
176. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (internal citation omitted).
177. Id. at 559.
178. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 568 (“[T]he States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does
not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.”).
180. Emerson, supra note 175, at 741–42 (discussing how “[f]reedom of expression is R
necessary to a democratic political process,” and that “the freedom of expression was not meant to
be confined to the political realm”).
181. Id. at 742.
182. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978) (“Freedom of speech and
the other freedoms encompassed by the First Amendment always have been viewed as
fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause . . . .”); see also
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (“The essence of [the First
Amendment] is the need for absolute neutrality by the government.”).
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VI. THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS MANDATE THAT ALL
“PAPERS” AND “EFFECTS” ARE PROTECTED AGAINST
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
The First and Fourth Amendments can work in tandem.183 In 1961,
the Court interpreted the historical interplay between the First and
Fourth Amendments: “This history was, of course, part of the intellec-
tual matrix within which our own constitutional fabric was shaped. The
Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that
unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for
stifling liberty of expression.”184 In Frank v. Maryland, Justice Douglas
opined that the Fourth Amendment does not principally regard searches
and seizures in the context of criminal cases: “The commands of our
First Amendment (as well as the prohibitions of the Fourth and the
Fifth) . . . are indeed closely related, safeguarding not only privacy and
protection against self-incrimination but conscience and human dignity
and freedom of expression as well.”185
The Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections and the First Amend-
ment’s freedom of speech and expression are similar principles.186
While both are clearly separate doctrines of law, First Amendment anal-
ysis often speaks of “privacy” when justifying the unconstitutionality of
some type of government action.187 For instance, in the First Amend-
ment analysis in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court explained, “for also fun-
damental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”188 In fact,
to illustrate the importance of the right to be free from governmental
intrusion, Stanley cited Justice Brandeis’ acclaimed dissent in Olmstead
v. United States, a case regarding the Fourth Amendment and property
rights:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
183. See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 729–31 (1961) (“The question here is
whether the use by Missouri in this case of the search and seizure power to suppress obscene
publications involved abuses inimical to protected expression.”).
184. Id. at 729.
185. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Frank, the Court upheld a conviction against a homeowner for refusing to
allow a municipal health inspector into his home for inspection purposes. Camara v. Mun. Court
of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967) (explaining the facts in Frank, 359 U.S. at 808).
Frank was overruled just eight years after it was decided when the Court, in Camara, explained
that even an inspection search must be reasonably justified with a warrant. Id. at 538.
186. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
187. Id.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
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They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Ameri-
cans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized man.189
Hence, the First and Fourth Amendments oftentimes operate in har-
mony, albeit silently, because both protect forms of privacy.190 Inherent
in the history of both amendments is the fundamental motive to end
British oppression and shape America into a free country.191 In further-
ance of this goal, the First and Fourth Amendments were designed to
protect society from unjust governmental action.192
A. Thoughts, Speech, and Private Information Are Stored on
Cell Phones
An average cell phone is capable of holding a profusion of personal
information. With smartphones full of “apps,”193 cell phone users can do
almost anything on their phones—from preserving medical records194 to
scribbling in a diary.195 Furthermore, most (if not all) smartphones have
built-in apps including a camera with videotaping capability, picture
storage, calendar, music storage, text messaging, note-taking capability,
alarm clock, personalized stock profiles, Facebook, and Twitter.196
There are, also, limitless options for apps available for download,
including apps for banking, traveling, and shopping.197 The rapid
increase in popularity in smartphones suggests that the traditional meth-
189. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
190. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985) (“The First Amendment imposes
special constrains on searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material and requires
that the Fourth Amendment be applied with scrupulous exactitude in such circumstances.”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
191. See Turley, supra note 166, at 57; Michael, supra note 135, at 906. R
192. Michael, supra note 135, at 906. R
193. Short for “application,” an “app” is a software program on computers or smartphones that
is typically specific to one purpose. Anita Campbell, What the Heck Is an “App”?, SMALL BUS.
TRENDS (May 7, 2011), http://smallbiztrends.com/2011/03/what-is-an-app.html.
194. MY MEDICAL, http://mymedicalapp.com/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (allowing users to
save, manage, and examine personal medical records on their cell phones).
195. DAY ONE, http://dayoneapp.com/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (allowing users to save
journal entries, messages, pictures, and more onto cell phone diary app).
196. See iPhone 5s, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/built-in-apps/ (last visited Feb.
10, 2014) (describing the built-in apps on all new iPhones); see also Farhan Z. Shah, Top Android
Apps for Samsung Galaxy S4 with Built In Apps Review, NEWS TRIBE (Mar. 16, 2013), http://
www.thenewstribe.com/2013/03/16/top-android-apps-for-samsung-galaxy-s4-with-built-in-apps-
review/ (discussing new built-in apps on the Android smartphone).
197. See iTunes Preview, APPLE, https://itunes.apple.com/us/genre/ios/id36?mt=8 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2014) (displaying the plethora of app genres offered by Apple).
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ods of, for example, writing in a diary, will be replaced by typing per-
sonal thoughts into a smartphone app.198 Thus, it is evident that cell
phones have the capacity to hold extremely private, personal
information.
A warrantless cell phone search incident to arrest can implicate
First Amendment protections. When police officers search through mod-
ern cell phones incident to arrest, the quantity of accessible private infor-
mation is staggering. Furthermore, information stored in a cell phone is
likely to contain thoughts, which the Court has recognized as protected
under the First Amendment.199 Just as anonymity was highly regarded
by the writers of the Federalist Papers and other great authors through-
out American history,200 authors (or owners) of any private information
contained in a smartphone should be protected from unwanted govern-
ment intrusions.201 Warrantless cell phone searches, therefore, impede
on First Amendment protections because people are free to think, write,
and read without fear of punishment.
B. A Cell Phone Is Equivalent to a “Paper” or “Effect”
Finally, as the Ohio Supreme Court, Florida Supreme Court, First
Circuit, and most importantly, the United States Supreme Court rea-
soned, smartphone searches necessitate protection under the Fourth
Amendment. A search of a cell phone uncovers far more than what a
warrantless search incident to arrest is intended to reveal.202 Thus, a cell
phone is analogous to a “paper” or “effect” and cannot be searched with-
out a warrant.203
Warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest do not comply
198. See Henry Blodget, Actually, the US Smartphone Revolution Has Entered the Late
Innings, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2012, 9:23 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-
smartphone-market-2012-9 (“[T]here are at least 165 million active Android and Apple iOS
devices in the U.S. and . . . they are used by 78% of the adult population (age 15–64).”).
199. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
gives a person “the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home”) (emphasis added); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 164 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)) (describing the
freedom of speech and thought as “the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other
form of freedom”).
200. See Turley, supra note 166, at 57–59 (discussing how the practice of anonymity for R
authors like George Elliot and the Framers was once normal).
201. See Emerson, supra note 175, at 747. R
202. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3104
(U.S. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13-212); Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 740 (Fla. 2013); State v.
Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009).
203. See Michael, supra note 135, at 912 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s “immediate R
aim . . . was to ban general warrants and writs of assistance.”).
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with the Court’s decision in Chimel.204 Contrary to the two justifications
for constitutional searches incident to arrest that the Court articulated in
Chimel, scrolling through the electronic contents of a cell phone could
not possibly expose a weapon threatening an officer’s immediate
safety.205 Furthermore, waiting to acquire a warrant before searching
through a cell phone will not result in its contents being destroyed, as
officers can take specific precautions such as placing the phone in a
Faraday bag while waiting for the issuance of a warrant.206 Unlike the
California Supreme Court’s finding in People v. Diaz, the Chadwick
case was instructive because a cell phone is closer to a footlocker than a
crumpled-up package of cigarettes.207 However, neither a cigarette box
nor a footlocker is truly appropriate to compare to a cell phone; it is
impossible to compare a cell phone’s enormous storage capacities and
numerous uses to these basic objects.208 Nonetheless, courts no longer
have to “fit a square peg into a round hole,”209 as clarity on the issue
now exists.210
The history and progression of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
guides analysis for treatment of smartphones “in our increasingly inter-
connected world.”211 Because cell phones have quickly become “con-
tainers” for massive amounts of personal information, unwarranted
searches of these containers are just the sort of activity that the Founding
Fathers so vehemently opposed. Further, classifying cell phones as
“papers” is significant because it “raises not only Fourth Amendment
issues, but also implicates serious First Amendment concerns . . . further
emphasiz[ing] the need for special protection of cell phones to prevent
the warrantless searches of cell phones incident to lawful arrest.”212
204. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (allowing searches incident to arrest
so that officer safety is not compromised and evidence is not destroyed).
205. See id.; see, e.g., Wurie, 728 F.3d at 14, aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473 (2014); Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 740; Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 956.
206. “Faraday bags,” as explained in United States v. Flores-Lopez, can prevent “remote
wipes” of cell phones by “isolat[ing] the cell phone from the phone network and from Bluetooth
or wireless Internet signals.” United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (2012).
207. See  People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011) (holding that warrantless cell phone
searches incident to arrest are constitutional). Compare United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11
(1977) (holding that a search of a footlocker incident to arrest was unconstitutional), with United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (finding that a search incident to arrest of a
crumpled cigarette package was constitutional).
208. See Warfield, supra note 15, at 185. R
209. Id.
210. The Supreme Court resolved the issue in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95
(2014).
211. See Michael, supra note 135, at 922. R
212. Jana L. Knott, Note, Is There an App for That? Reexamining the Doctrine of Search
Incident to Lawful Arrest in the Context of Cell Phones, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 445, 457
(2010).
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VII. THE END OF WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE SEARCHES
Chief Justice Roberts authored the Court’s unanimous decision
finding that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest are
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.213 In affirming the First
Circuit’s decision in Wurie and reversing the California Court of
Appeal’s holding in Riley, the Court engaged in an analysis of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence similar to that of the lower courts that grap-
pled with the issue.214
In Riley v. California, the Court came to its conclusion pursuant to
three cases discussed above: Chimel,215 Robinson,216 and Gant.217 The
Court first explained that Chimel “laid the groundwork for most of the
existing search incident to arrest doctrine.”218 It discussed the categori-
cal rule that Chimel established: searches of the arrestee, and the area
within the arrestee’s immediate control, are reasonable in order to
remove weapons or evidence that the arrestee could later use, conceal, or
destroy.219
The Court then engaged in a detailed explanation of Robinson.220
Chief Justice Roberts explained that although the Robinson Court found
that a search of a cigarette package inside of an arrestee’s pocket “was
reasonable even though there was no concern about the loss of evidence,
and the arresting officer had no specific concern that Robinson might be
armed,”221 it “did not draw a line between a search of Robinson’s person
and a further examination of the cigarette pack found during that
search.”222 The Chief Justice stated that only when Chadwick was
decided a few years later did the Court draw this line by limiting the
Robinson exception to “personal property . . . immediately associated
with the person of the arrestee.”223
Further, the Court discussed Gant and the added “independent
exception for a warrantless search” that it authorizes.224 In Gant, the
Court approved of a warrantless search of the passenger compartment
inside of a car when an officer reasonably believed “evidence relevant to
213. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95.
214. Id. at 2482–84.
215. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
216. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
217. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).




222. Id. at 2484.
223. Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)).
224. Id.
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the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”225 This exception
does not stem from Chimel, but instead from “circumstances unique to
the vehicle context.”226
Before applying these cases to searches incident to arrest of
smartphones, “which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily
life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy,” the Court noted that smartphone
technology was inconceivable when Chimel and Robinson were
decided.227 Consequently, the Court found that neither of the rationales
in Chimel “has much force with respect to digital content on cell
phones,” and further, a cell phone search “bears little resemblance to the
type of brief physical search considered in Robinson.”228
The Court, then, delved into the two Chimel rationales, disposing of
various arguments in favor of constitutionalizing warrantless cell phone
searches incident to arrest.229 First, “digital data stored on a cell phone
cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to
effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”230 The Court clarified that requiring a
warrant to search a cell phone does not preclude an officer from ensur-
ing that a weapon is not hidden within a cell phone, i.e., “to determine
whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case.”231
However, in comparing a search of a cell phone to the search of the
cigarette pack in Robinson, the Court explained that because the officer
in Robinson could not identify what was inside of the cigarette pack, its
in-depth search was reasonable.232 In contrast, “[n]o such unknowns
exist with respect to digital data.”233
Permitting warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest
does not further the second Chimel rationale, preventing destruction of
evidence. The government argued that cell phones are prone to remote
wiping or data encryption, methods used to eliminate or restrict accessi-
bility of data on a cell phone.234 First, the Court explained that under
Chimel, the concern for preventing destruction of evidence occurs at the
scene of the arrest, not in separate locations by third parties presumably
conducting a remote wipe.235 Further, the Court found that the govern-
225. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
226. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.
227. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
228. Id. at 2484–85.
229. Id. at 2483.




234. Id. at 2486.
235. Id.
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ment’s focus on data encryption involves “operation of a phone’s secu-
rity features” and is “apart from any active attempt by a defendant or his
associates to conceal or destroy evidence upon arrest.”236
Regardless, the Court explained, police officers have access to
methods to prevent cell phones from remote wipes.237 Using Faraday
bags, made of aluminum foil that isolates a phone from radio waves, or
removing a phone’s battery, will prevent destruction of evidence.238 Fur-
ther, if police are confronted with a situation where the need for an
immediate search of a cell phone is evident, the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement can apply.239
Finally, the Court considered the unique nature of cell phones in
comparison to “other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person”
and can be searched.240 The Court discussed the vast storage capacity in
modern cell phones: “[A] cell phone collects in one place many distinct
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank state-
ment, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated
record.”241 Consequently, simply browsing through an arrestee’s
smartphone can reveal “the sum of an individual’s private life . . .
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and
descriptions.”242 Hence, with more than ninety percent of Americans
owning cell phones, a digital record of private information is readily
available on most people at all times.243 “Allowing the police to scruti-
nize such records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing
them to search a personal item or two in the occasional case.”244
While the Court concluded that warrantless cell phone searches
were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Rob-
erts’ opinion implicated, albeit indistinctly, First Amendment con-
cerns.245 The Riley Court compared the extensive and readily available
data on a cell phone to a pre-smartphone era diary that is hardly readily
available, to demonstrate how rare a scenario it was for police officers to
perform a search incident to arrest and stumble upon truly private infor-
mation.246 The Court explained that “there is an element of pervasive-
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2487.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2489.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 2490.
244. Id.
245. See id. (discussing the discoveries of items containing personal thoughts, like diaries, as
“few and far between”).
246. Id.
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ness that characterizes cell phones but not physical records,” implicating
that it disfavored authorizing police officers to freely browse private
ideas, thoughts, and information stored on a cell phone.247 In keeping
with the Court’s established rights under the First Amendment—the
right to privacy248 and the right to receive information and ideas249—the
Court took issue with permitting warrantless searches of cell phones
incident to arrest.250
The amount of private information found in a modern cell phone
dwarfs any non-digitized item that can be hidden in a cigarette package.
In concluding, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[t]he fact that technol-
ogy now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does
not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the
Founders fought.”251
The Supreme Court plainly answered the question that many state
and federal courts have wrestled with since 2007:252 What, if anything,
must police do before searching a cell phone? The answer “is accord-
ingly simple—get a warrant.”253
247. See id.
248. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–88 (1965) (finding a fundamental right to
privacy under the “penumbras” and “emanations” of various amendments, including the First
Amendment; “the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion.”).
249. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
250. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488 (“[W]hen privacy-related concerns are weighty enough a search
may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
251. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
252. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258 (5th Cir. 2007).
253. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
